



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

appreciation of the economic, educational, æsthetic, and moral victories of the Century of Peace, which *should* be far more renowned than those of the War of 1812, and which may well make the whole world exclaim: "This is the Lord's doing; it is marvelous in our eyes."

"Organized Insanity" or The Hague.

A REPLY TO ADMIRAL MAHAN.

By George W. Nasmyth.

In the remarkable indictment of the international armament competition published by Mr. Lloyd George as an interview in the *London Daily Chronicle* of January 1, 1914, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer refers to the overwhelming expenditure on armaments as "organized insanity." "No country has gained in strength as a result of this growth of expenditure," he said. "We are all relatively exactly where we were. I cannot think of any advantage which has been reaped by any country in the world from this increase of military and naval expenditure. But I can think of a good deal of harm which has been done to all countries. . . . The common sense of the industrial classes, be they capitalist or labor, has risen against this organized insanity. This is a propitious moment for reconsidering the question of armaments."

This condition of "organized insanity" and the folly of the international competition of armaments is being realized by "the man in the street" in all countries with increasing vividness. It has been the conspicuous service of Norman Angell* to point out the intimate connection between this "organized insanity" and the dominance, in our thinking on the subject, of certain fallacies and outworn axioms concerning the rôle of military power in modern international relations. Everything which tends to confused thinking on the great international question of armaments, therefore, leads us deeper into the grip of this "organized insanity," and every effort toward intellectual sanitation prepares the way for a solution of the armament problem and a more rational organization of the world.

One of the most flagrant examples of the fallacies and loose reasoning, unfortunately so common in the discussion of the armament question, is found in an article entitled "The Folly of The Hague," by Admiral Mahan, recently spread over the country as an editorial in the magazine section of the Sunday newspapers of New York and other cities. The confusion of thought upon one of the most important and vital questions of the day revealed by this article is so great that it seems worth while to analyze the reasoning and point out some of the fallacies, especially as they are typical of many of the arguments advanced by the defenders of militarism at the present time.

A fundamental confusion in regard to the nature of physical force, in Admiral Mahan's mind, leads to a

curious method of reasoning in a circle. When he is confronted with the moral arguments against war, he usually takes refuge in the thesis that the causes of war are economic and material. But when he is overwhelmed with the proofs of the economic futility of war, he falls back upon the claim that the causes of war are ideal and moral, not economic and material. Thus, in his "Armaments and Arbitration," he says (p. 113):

"The armaments of the European States now are not so much for protection against conquest as to secure to themselves the utmost possible share of the unexploited or imperfectly exploited regions of the world—the outlying markets or storehouses of raw material, which, under national control, shall minister to national emoluments."

This naked statement of the materialistic purpose of armament for aggression and exploitation is in striking contrast with his definition of the purpose of armaments in his latest article. Here he holds armaments up as the beneficent power which protects the quiet and weak and allows them to sleep securely. His new point of view is:

"Armament is the organization and consecration of force as a factor in the maintenance of justice, order, and peace. It is the highest expression of that element in civilization—force—which has created and now upholds society, giving efficacy to the pronouncements of law, whether by the legislature or in the courts. Organized force alone enables the quiet and the weak to go about their business and to sleep securely, safe from the assaults of violence without or within."

It is clear that Admiral Mahan would not contradict himself so flatly as in the passages quoted above if he did not labor under a fundamental confusion, which runs all through his writing, as to the real nature of physical force.

Three Kinds of Armed Force.

Three kinds of physical force must be distinguished in order to reason clearly upon the subject and to avoid the process of self-contradiction to which Admiral Mahan falls a victim when he thus includes all three under the one term armament. These three kinds of physical force are:

I. Force used for the maintenance of order—police force.

II. Force used to neutralize aggression—defense.

III. Force used for aggression—attack.

It is clearly the first of these—police force—that Admiral Mahan means when he speaks of armament as the consecration of force for the maintenance of justice, order, and peace. But this is just what armament is not. Its purposes are confined almost entirely to defense and attack. We do not speak of a mining town, with no central authority for maintaining order, and with every inhabitant—gamblers, thieves, and good citizens alike—armed to the teeth and shooting at sight, as having a very high degree of justice, order, and peace, although there is armament enough and to spare. This is the present condition of anarchy in international relations, with no strong central authority to enforce order, and armament confined to the functions of attack and defense. But security must be had at all costs, and as mankind, driven by economic pressure and the conviction of the folly of armaments, sets about to erect

* See "The Great Illusion, a Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Welfare," and "Arms and Industry, a Study of the Foundations of International Policy": G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, for a demonstration that armaments are morally, socially, and economically futile under modern conditions.

a system of law and an international court at The Hague, Admiral Mahan jeers at the attempt, just as the bully in the mining town probably jeered at the erection of the first court-house and the beginnings of civic law and order. Read with a sane regard for the facts of international relations, what could be a more eloquent demonstration of the necessity for the organization of an international court at The Hague, supported by the necessary international police powers, than the following paragraphs from "The Folly of The Hague":

"That parts of New York City are esteemed unsafe at times to the ordinary citizen is due to inadequacy of organized force for his protection, to whatever that inadequacy be attributed. This social assurance has become so essential that mankind will submit to much restriction of liberty, if continued security of life and property can be had by no other means. The despot follows close on the heels of anarchy.

"Nations have the same need for quiet that the individual feels, and the necessity is the more urgent by so much as the welfare of millions exceeds that of individuals. Although under imperfect police conditions many are exposed to violence, the sufferers are comparatively few; while if the incidents be frequent, the community becomes aroused and suppression follows. But war not only affects many directly by death, but, through the complicated network of social and economic relations, involves indirectly all members of the state."

Admiral Mahan proceeds to confuse the second and third kinds of physical force—aggression and defense—and illustrates his confusion by reference to the conditions in the Balkans under the Turkish rule and in Cuba in 1898. Armament put an end to this, he says, forgetting that it was the armament of the Turk and the armament of Spain that first gave rise to these evils. For four hundred years the Turks, who conquered the Balkans by the sword, lived in the Balkans by the sword. Have the armaments, or "consecrated force," of Turkey maintained peace and order in the Balkans for the past four hundred years? Did the armament of Spain maintain justice in Cuba? We see at once that no clear thinking can be done upon the subject until the three kinds of armed force which Admiral Mahan includes under the term "armament" are distinguished. It was not until the armed force of Turkey was neutralized by opposing armed force that peace and order appeared and Bulgaria began to rise. It was after the armament of Spain had been neutralized and destroyed by opposing armament that the voice of reason and justice could be heard in Cuba. The cases cited by Admiral Mahan are examples of a familiar fallacy of militaristic reasoning in which the fact is disregarded that the use of armed force is the origin of the evils from which the wars mentioned gave deliverance.

The confidence of Admiral Mahan in armament as a panacea for all the injustice of the world is touching, but he never gets a glimpse of the truth that all the evils he cites are caused by armament in the first place, and that all that armament can do is to neutralize other armament and to reveal the folly of depending upon armament to settle anything in the end. Sooner or later the armed force of aggression is opposed and neutralized by armed force of defense, the way is opened for the rise of nations, and the productive and creative forces of society are set free. It is co-operation and the mutual interdependence of men which holds society

together, and not the negative power of armed force, as Admiral Mahan contends.

Arbitration and the Increasing Cost of War.

No reference is made in the article on "The Folly of The Hague" to the fact that the Palace of Peace at The Hague came into existence to satisfy a real need—to house a court of arbitration created by the forty-four nations which took part in the Second Hague Conference. Not a word is said about the twelve important cases which have already been successfully arbitrated by this Hague Court. It is the growing realization of the futility of armed force for aggression which makes arbitration possible. With the increasing cost of modern war, even the victor must lose more than he can possibly gain by conquest, and the way is open either for arbitration or for direct compromise, as in the case of the Moroccan affair between France and Germany. Unless they are willing to live in a state of continual insecurity and frequent warfare, nations simply cannot go to war over every dispute which diplomacy fails to settle. With the increasing cost of war, the possible sacrifice of larger or "vital" interests, or so-called "national honor" (in countries where the code of the duel still survives, and the theory is held that honor can be infringed by another and avenged by the use of force), becomes a much less evil than a victorious war, and a way must be found for settling these disputes without resort to armed force. The method of arbitration must be used, where diplomacy breaks down, on the basis of Admiral Mahan's own statement of the indispensable nature of peace and order. At first the field for arbitration is limited; nations will rather resort to the sword than submit to a possible unfavorable judgment in arbitration. But the limits of arbitration rapidly enlarge, on account of the decreasing fruits of victory and the increasing cost of even victorious war in modern society. Here the intangible nature of modern wealth, which can no longer be seized by the conqueror, and the increasing economic interdependence of nations become powerful factors. Finally enough room is left between the most a victor could gain and the least the vanquished could lose by war to permit practically all disputes to be arbitrated. The last stage is that in which there is so much play left for arbitration between the limits set by possible gains and losses that the dispute can be decided, not on the basis of the relative strength of the two contending parties, but on the basis of justice.

Armament and War.

Another fundamental error in the reasoning of Admiral Mahan arises from his failure to distinguish between the cost of armament and the cost of war itself as a preventive of war. He has a glimpse of the truth when he says:

"But war not only affects many directly by death, but through the complicated network of social and economical relations, involves indirectly all the members of the state."

This is the real cause of the disappearance of war between the highly organized nations of Europe in the past generation. The outbreak of a war between them would cause the shattering of credit, the foundations of which have now become entirely international, a col-

lapse of industry, which is built upon international credit, and would lead to a panic much more dangerous and devastating than those in the United States in 1873 and 1893 or the world panic of 1907. To the loss and suffering caused by the failure of credit and the breakdown of industry would be added the misery due to the destruction of life and property through the war itself. Moreover, when the economic restraints which act to prevent war are once broken down, it is easier for further wars to break out, so that each war is likely to bring in its train a series of other wars, and to involve an increasing number of nations. The enormous increase of the cost of modern war between industrial nations, which even for the victor now means national bankruptcy, and the impossibility of predicting how far such a war would extend or what its outcome would be, is the economic force which prevents wars, not the cost of armament in time of peace.

During the Morocco crises of 1905 and 1911, it was the fall of prices on the Berlin stock market, leading straight toward a financial panic and industrial collapse, which made the German Foreign Office stay its hand and adopt a more conciliatory course; it was not the consideration as to whether the French army had 500,000 or 200,000 men on a peace footing or the cost of the French armament during those years of peace.

It is the cost of war, of which the financial and economic effects form the most important part in this century, and not the cost of armament, that has abolished war among the highly organized nations of modern Europe and relegated it to the unorganized—85-per-cent-illiterate—nations on the periphery of the modern civilized world.

"Adequate" Armament.

"Armament alone can sustain our position," says Admiral Mahan at the conclusion of his article, "and to do it bloodlessly the armament must be imperatively adequate."

This might be true if the United States were the only nation concerned; but armament is always an international question, never a national one alone. The militarists of Germany, Austria, England, France, Italy, and Russia are also clamoring for armaments that are imperatively "adequate." The result is the mad race toward poverty and ruin in the modern armament competition. Germany cannot find a much-needed two and a quarter million dollars for completing her old-age pension system, but has no difficulty in raising \$250,000,000 for an unprecedented increase in her armament, and still it is not "adequate." Austria, in the throes of an industrial crisis, is trying to squeeze the same amount out of her poverty-stricken people to make her armament "adequate." France has raised her term of conscription from two to three years for every male citizen and is spending new millions on her aerial fleet, but her armament, according to the militarists, is far from "adequate." England has increased her annual military expenditure by \$225,583,000 since 1872, and her generals and admirals are still clamoring for more "adequate" armament. In forty years the United States has increased its annual expenditure for army and navy by 331 per cent, and is now pouring \$244,177,000

yearly into the bottomless pit of militarism; but its armament is not yet "adequate." Before we take more capital from the hard-pressed productive industries of the country to throw to the hungry armament interests for whom Admiral Mahan, probably unconsciously, is acting as a cat's-paw, we must ask for a definition of "adequate" armament which will not be subject to the changes which our militarists have constantly introduced in the past. We must demand that Admiral Mahan and the militarists consider the problem, not in terms of one nation, but of two, and in relation to the whole international situation and the recent history of armament competition.* If armament policies continue to be based upon the "one nation" method of treating an international problem, armament must increase and consume national wealth as fast as it can be created, leading in the end to financial breakdown and a long-continued industrial depression, with all its train of suffering and poverty. Already unmistakable signs of discontent are visible among the armament-burdened workers of Europe. Lloyd George has made clear the goal of the armament competition in his speech in the House of Commons on August 31, 1913:

"I am genuinely alarmed about the expenditure on armaments," he said. "I feel confident that if it goes on it will end in great disaster. I will not say disaster to this country, but it is just possible it may end in a great disaster, because a protest will come about the consequences of this enormous expenditure. The inevitable consequence of this expenditure on armaments is a state of things that will goad the people into something which will be a sort of revolutionary protest."

The Meaning of The Hague.

The alternative, then, is not arbitration or armament; it is arbitration or bankruptcy and revolution. The only course which can preserve civilization from the destructive forces of anarchy and disorder is to develop the principle of arbitration, backed up by an enlightened public opinion, and, if necessary, by an international police force composed of a small fraction of the present national armaments. This is the significance of The Hague; it is the beginning of the organization of the world. The Palace of Peace stands as a concrete symbol, which the man in the street can understand, of the method of settling international disputes in a more rational way than the ruinous method of armament competition and war. And the man in the street is beginning to ask, with more and more insistence, why, in view of the demonstrated futility of physical force and armament to settle anything, the method of arbitration should not be used.

Militarism at The Hague.

Admiral Mahan's attack on arbitration and The Hague recalls the fact that he was one of the American delegates to the First Hague Conference, and is now a member of the National Citizens' Committee for the calling of the Third Hague Conference. When we consider the proportion of militarists holding the same

* See the chapter "Two Keels to One Not Enough," in Norman Angell's "Arms and Industry," for a proof of the inadequacy of armament alone to maintain national safety, and the necessity for enlightened public opinion as the true solution of the problem.

viewpoint as Admiral Mahan, who were delegates to the last two Hague conferences, we can understand the reasons for the reactionary attitude of these conferences toward questions of peace and arbitration which Mr. Jackson H. Ralston pointed out so forcibly at the 1913 Lake Mohonk Conference. When we trace the acts of the American delegation, for example, we find the members bound by the unit rule to obey the views of Admiral Mahan,* so that because he could not see any reason for prohibiting the dropping of projectiles from the air, the use of dum-dum bullets, and the like, the American delegation was forced to take the most reactionary position on these questions of any delegation at the conference. It is obviously useless to expect great advance to be made by the Third Hague Conference if it is to be composed of delegates holding views similar to those of Admiral Mahan as expressed in "The Folly of The Hague."

At the Third Hague Conference, in 1916, the American delegation should be composed of men who are really in sympathy with the movement for peace and arbitration and with the work of The Hague, and our delegation should take an advanced position of leadership and serve as a rallying center for all the progressive forces of the conference. *To secure the greatest possible advance, the American delegation to the Third Hague Conference should be composed of diplomats, experts in the fields of international law, international trade, and other branches of international relations, who are known to be in sympathy with the objects of the conference. If representatives of the army and navy accompany the delegation, they should be sent only in an advisory capacity, without the power to vote.*

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

A New Department of the New York Peace Society.

By Marion Tilden Burritt, Department Secretary.

On June 1, 1913, a systematic campaign was begun for bringing the members of women's organizations in New York and New Jersey into closer touch with the aims and purposes of the peace movement, and for creating a more intelligent opinion among them concerning international policies. These were ends to be sought not only for themselves, but as means toward the eventual development of some suitable form of State-wide organization which will become a force in shaping national legislation along progressive and enlightened pacifist lines.

It had become evident to many of the friends of peace, that in spite of the splendid work that had been done by international bodies and the very substantial progress made by the two Hague conferences, in spite of the efforts made by the various peace organizations for educational propaganda, yet the mass of even cultured and generally well-informed people remained largely oblivious to the significance of these transactions.

For a considerable time the church and the school have been used as mediums for the dissemination of

knowledge upon this subject; but little had been done systematically to utilize that third agency for popular education—the woman's club.

There are still many people who do not yet fully realize that the woman's club has become quite as much of an established institution as the church or the school. In New York State there are over 200,000 women organized in nearly 400 clubs, representing over 150 cities and towns, affiliated with the State Federation, to say nothing of the large numbers in organizations not so affiliated. These clubs meet sometimes weekly, sometimes fortnightly, always at least monthly, and furnish hundreds of platforms for the discussion of problems of public interest.

Whatever a woman gets at her club she takes to her dinner table, and it is no exaggeration to say that in smaller places—where the club interest is strong—the whole town will be discussing at night any noteworthy statements made at a club meeting in the afternoon. The doings of these clubs thus form a large part of the local news, and space is readily granted in the local press for the pronouncements of speakers.

It therefore seemed obvious that the next step in popular propaganda should be the utilizing of this tremendous force. The time was ripe for such a step owing to the fact that, at its last biennial convention, the General Federation of Women's Clubs had passed a resolution recommending that each club appoint one or more of its members as a peace committee, to keep in touch with the progress of the movement and bring important peace questions to the attention of members.

Although this splendid machinery stood ready at hand, and the study of peace by the individual clubs had been officially sanctioned, nevertheless it was evident the machinery would not put itself in motion. A year or two ago the New York State Federation had passed resolutions for the study of peace, but had refused to appoint a special committee for the subject, and as, therefore, there was no group within the organization authorized to push it and no committee in the peace society itself to perform a similar function, it was not a surprise to find that the individual clubs were not forming peace committees.

It was felt, therefore, that in order to make the work in the clubs effective, there should be a body of enthusiasts outside the organization to force the subject upon their consideration and to make it easy for them to come in touch with the subject. The Consumers' League, the Child Welfare Association, the Anti-Tuberculosis organizations, and the like, are constantly forcing their reforms upon the attention of the clubs, and it was evident that the peace society would have to employ equally insistent methods to acquire and maintain a vigorous hold among so many conflicting interests.

The problem, therefore, was two-fold: first, to arouse the interest of the club women themselves; and, secondly, to create among those already allied with the peace society the same enthusiasm for extending a knowledge of the cause that is displayed by those working to forward other reforms.

During June and July over one hundred letters were sent to the presidents of clubs in the various parts of the State and in near-by sections of New Jersey, and about twenty-five letters to certain members of the

* For further details of Admiral Mahan's reactionary influence at the First Hague Conference see "The New Peace Movement," by William I. Hull, Chap. X.